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that since the lighter performed in a
manner consistent with the expectation of the ordinary consumer, it was
not unreasonably dangerous and Bic
was not strictly liable.
Todd next argued that the
consumer contemplation test should
consider the expectation of the
foreseeable user, instead of only the
ordinary consumer. For purposes of
the appeal, Bic had conceded that
children were foreseeable users of
its lighter. Therefore, Todd contended that the court improperly
granted summary judgment because
it failed to include children in its
consumer contemplation test
analysis.
Turning to this issue, the Circuit
Court declared that Illinois law
clearly indicates that the applicable
standard in the consumer contemplation test is the expectation of the
ordinary consumer. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that children,
unlike ordinary consumers, do not
possess the knowledge common to
the community, and as a result, their
expectations are inappropriate for
consideration in the consumer
contemplation test. In addition, the

court warned that allowing such a
standard would result in absolute
liability for manufacturers because
children do not perceive the dangers
that are inherent in every product.
For these reasons, the court concluded that it is inappropriate to
consider the expectations of the
foreseeable user in the consumer
contemplation test.

Test not always applicable
Todd then argued that the district
court's failure to consider the riskutility test, in addition to the
consumer contemplation test,
mandated reversal of the summary
judgment. He insisted that the
lighter might be unreasonably
dangerous under either test. Under
the risk-utility test, a product is
unreasonably dangerous, even when
it meets consumer expectations, if:
(1) the defective design is excessively dangerous and preventable;
and (2) the risk of danger in the
design outweighs the benefits.
The Seventh Circuit observed
that, in certain cases, the Illinois
Supreme Court has adopted the

risk-utility test. However, in such
situations, the product in controversy was complex and the risk it
presented was not obvious. In the
case at hand, it found the lighter was
a simple and obviously dangerous
product. The Circuit Court held that
the risk-utility test would not apply
to a simple but obviously dangerous
product because it was unlikely that
the Illinois Supreme Court would
apply the test to such a product.
The Circuit Court then addressed
two final issues: (1) whether the
warning was adequate; and (2)
whether the manufacturer was
negligent. It affirmed the District
Court's holding that the warning
was adequate. The court also found
that Bic was not negligent because
the product was not unreasonably
dangerous. Therefore, Bic did not
breach its duty to produce a reasonably safe product. In so finding, the
Circuit Court concluded that an
ordinary disposable cigarette lighter
is not unreasonably dangerous so as
to warrant holding its manufacturer
negligent or strictly liable.
Please see "Lighter liability" on page 38

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act awards limited
By Judith Gorske
In Wright v. FinanceServ. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F3d
647 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the executor of a decedent's estate
had standing to sue a debt collection agency under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1692 to 1692o, for violations involving letters sent
by the agency to the decedent. The court also held that
Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) of the FDCPA limits additional
damages to $1,000 per proceeding.
Gladys Finch died in October, 1989. After her death,
Finance Service of Norwalk (Finance Service), a debt-
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collection agency, sent Finch 14 letters attempting to
collect $112 for an allegedly overdue medical bill.
Betty Wright, acting as executor for the estate, notified
Finance Service of Finch's death. The agency then
discontinued its correspondence.
Wright then filed a complaint against Finance
Service in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, alleging a total of 30 FDCPA violations
contained within the 14 letters Finance Service had sent
Finch. Subsequently, both parties moved for partial
summary judgment. Wright sought partial summary
judgment on the issue of the 30 alleged FDCPA violations. Finance Service moved for partial summary
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judgment on the issue of Wright's standing to bring suit
on Finch's behalf. In addition, Finance Service sought a
ruling in limine limiting Wright's recovery to $1,000 for
damages in excess of actual losses, costs, and fees.
In ruling on the motions, the District Court partially
granted Wright's motion for summary judgment,
finding Finance Service liable for 14 FDCPA violations.
It denied Finance Service's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Wright's standing, allowing
her to bring suit on behalf of Finch's estate. Finally, the
court granted Finance Service's motion in limine, and
limited additional damages to $1,000 per proceeding.
Wright appealed the District Court's decision
limiting her damages to the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, contending that she was entitled to collect
$1,000 for each separate FDCPA violation. Finance
Service, in turn, cross-appealed the district court's
determination that Wright had standing to bring the suit.
A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed Wright's
standing to bring suit on behalf of the decedent's estate,
but reversed the lower court's decision limiting additional damages. The panel's decision was vacated and a
rehearing en banc was granted by order.

Executor may sue debt collection agency
The Sixth Circuit initially addressed the issue of
whether Wright had standing to bring suit on behalf of
Finch's estate. In its analysis, the court turned to the
statutory language in question. Specifically, it focused
on 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), which provides that "any debt
collector who fails to comply with any provision.. .with
respect to any person is liable to such person." The
Circuit Court determined that the phrase "with respect
to any person" included persons such as Wright, who
"stand in the shoes of the debtor." Moreover, the court
noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) prohibited a debt
collector from using "any false, deceptive, or misleading misrepresentation.. .in connection with the collection of any debt." It recognized that this provision could
be violated even if a debt collection practice did not
offend the alleged debtor herself. Taking the plain
language of the FDCPA, together with its stated purpose
and legislative history, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
District Court's ruling on the issue of standing. In so
doing, it held that Wright, as the executor of the estate,
was entitled to bring suit for the FDCPA violations.
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Additional damages limited to $1,000
The Circuit Court then turned its attention to the
issue of whether additional damages should be limited
to $1,000 per proceeding rather than per violation. It
first examined the language of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(2)(A), which states that additional damages
may not exceed $1,000 "in the case of any action by
any individual." The court found nothing in the plain
statutory language, legislative history, or other sections
of the FDCPA to suggest that Congress intended to limit
additional damages to $1,000 per violation rather than
per proceeding.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit noted that Section
1692k(a)(2)(A) required the court to consider the
frequency and persistence of noncompliance in any
action. According to the court, this requirement
reflected Congress' anticipation of repeated violations
as the subject of a single action or proceeding. The
Circuit Court also found support for this statutory
interpretation in Section 1692k(a)(2)(B), which limits
the amount of additional damages in class actions to
"the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth
of the debt collector." In conclusion, the court declared
that it would be incongruous to provide a limitation on
class actions without a corresponding cap on individual
recovery of damages. The discrepancy would permit an
individual plaintiff to "recover more in damages than a
similarly situated plaintiff representing a class of
claimants."
Although limiting a plaintiff's additional damages to
$1,000 per proceeding, rather than per violation,
appears to minimize the statute's deterrent value in
preventing debt collection abuses, the court observed
that other provisions in the statute acted as sufficient
deterrence. For example, provisions such as Sections
1692(a)(1) and 1692(a)(3)allow a plaintiff to recover
actual damages, court costs, and attorney's fees in their
entirety. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that
Wright's recovery for additional damages was limited
to $1,000 per proceeding, rather than $1,000 per
violation.

Disagreement over entitlement to sue
Judge Kennedy delivered a separate opinion. While
he concurred with the decision limiting recovery for
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damages per proceeding, he dissented from court's holding that an
executor or executor representing an
estate had standing to bring a FDCPA
action. In particular, he disputed the
majority's interpretation of the
phrase "any person" as found in
Section 1692k(a), contending that
the term consumer referred to any
natural person obligated or allegedly
obligated to pay a debt. As Wright
had brought action as decedent's
executor, Judge Kennedy suggested
that the real party interest was that
of the estate. Therefore, the executor
had no standing to bring suit since
the letters were not attempts to
collect the debt of a consumer, as
required under Section 1692a(3).
Furthermore, Judge Kennedy
noted that Section 1692c(d), which
governs debt collection communications, expanded the definition of
"consumer" to include the
consumer's executor. This specific
inclusion of "executor" in Section
1692c(d) implied that an executor
was not otherwise considered a
consumer. Additionally, the FDCPA
was designed to protect consumers
from abusive debt collection
practices which contribute to
problems such as marital instability,
job loss, personal bankruptcies and
invasion of privacy. Because such
problems did not exist in the present
case, Judge Kennedy concluded that
the statute had been misapplied.

Dissent criticizes limit
In a separate dissenting opinion,
Judge Jones rejected the majority's
imposition of a per proceeding
rather than a per violation limit. He
disagreed with the majority's
interpretation that the language "in
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the case of any action" found in
Section 1692k(a)(2)(A) required a
per proceeding limitation. Judge
Jones stated that the language
merely distinguished between the
statute's treatment of individual
actions from class actions. Furthermore, he contended that the FDCPA's
purpose and history suggested that
the $1,000 limit should be applied to
each violation. He concluded that to
find otherwise would frustrate the
FDCPA's broadly stated goal to
remedy debt collection abuse,
discourage consumers from pursuing
fdcpa claims, and encourage debt
collectors, having engaged in an
initial violation, to continue abusive
practices.

Lessees' rights
spelled out
Continuedfrom page 27
Turning again to the statutory
provision in question, the Seventh
Circuit found that the statute's
language plainly requires the lessor
to identify all warranties from the
manufacturers. It found the statements contained in the disputed
lease to offer no information as to
the nature of the manufacturer
warranties provided to the lessees.
The circuit court concluded that the
lease did not meet the statutory
requirement and reversed as a matter
of law.
In sum, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found that a cause of action under
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
accrues when an automobile lessee
knows or reasonably should have
known that the lessor misrepre-

sented its rights and liabilities to the
lessee. Moreover, it held that a
lessee must demonstrate standing in
order to seek a declaratory judgment
on whether an early termination
provision violates state law. However, the same standing standard is
not required when a lessee brings
suit contending inadequate disclosure of the contract's termination
formula and warranty under the
federal Consumer Leasing Act.

Utility expenses
may not be split
Continuedfrom page 29
Finally, the court held that even
though a public policy violation
could support a finding of an unfair
business practice, the Castruccios'
actions violated no Maryland public
policy.
A breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment involves failure to
provide something that goes to the
essence of what a landlord is
supposed to provide. Under this
covenant, a landlord is liable to her
tenant for the difference between
what she should provide and what
she has provided.
With this in mind, Legg asserted
that the Castruccios breached the
covenant of quiet enjoyment in
several ways. First, she contended
that they interfered with her use of
her own apartment by burdening her
with another tenant's utility usage.
Second, she contended that they
failed to reimburse her for the
upstairs tenants' delinquent payments. Third, she contended that
they failed to take action against
Papilon and Harcourt when they
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became aware of the delinquency.
Moreover, Legg alleged that the
Castruccios had the power to take
such action because their lease
agreement with the upstairs tenants
included a provision that the they
split the utility bills with Legg.
In ruling on the issue, the court
acknowledged that a landlord may
breach the covenant of quiet
enjoyment if the conduct of one
tenant impedes another tenant's use
of her premises, and the landlord has
legal authority to control the
impeding tenant's conduct, but does
nothing. Using an analogy to Legg's
situation, the court concluded that
when a landlord burdens one tenant
with liability for another tenant's
utility usage, the liable tenant had no
prior knowledge of that burden, and
did not consent to it, the landlord
breaches the covenant. It so holding,
the court reasoned that such conduct
interferes with the liable tenant's use
of her premises. Since Legg was
burdened in this way, the
Castruccios breached the covenant
of quiet enjoyment.
However, the court also found
that Legg clearly waived her right to
recover when she accepted payment
from the upstairs tenants for their
share of the utilities. Nevertheless, it
suggested that Legg might overcome
this waiver if she could demonstrate
that she had complained to the
Castruccios and that they failed to
take appropriate action within a
reasonable period of time.
Finally, the court also found that
the trial judge was "clearly erroneous" in concluding that the Castruccios did not have any legal
authority to evict the upstairs tenants
for failing to pay their share. The
facts were undisputed that the
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Castruccios had an agreement with
the upstairs tenants for partial
payment of Legg's utility bills.

Case remanded
The appellate court remanded the
case to the circuit court to determine
if and when Legg actually complained to the Castruccios. It stated
that a cause of action for breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment
entitled Legg to damages accrued
only after she complained to the
Castruccios. Moreover, the
Castruccios were entitled to sufficient time to correct the breach.
Thus, if Legg never actually
complained to the Castruccios, she
could not overcome her waiver of
her right to recover.

False advertising
rules clarified
Continuedfrom page 32
the plaintiff, the Waits court held
that the Lanham Act protects both
competitors and noncompetitors
who have been injured commercially by the "deceptive and misleading use of the marks." This was
the case in Smith. However, in cases
such as Halicki, where the claim
involves false advertising as to a
product's quality, the Lanham Act
protects only those plaintiffs who
allege that the false advertising
amounted to unfair competition, i.e.,
competitors with a commercial
interest at stake. The Ninth Circuit
found that the Lanham Act protects
the interests of noncompetitors only
in cases where a trademark violation
is alleged.

Standard adopted
In continuing its analysis, the
Third Circuit proceeded to review its
own jurisdictional case law. The
court noted its own sharp criticism
of the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Colligan. In Thorn v. Reliance Van
Co., Inc., 736 F.2d 929 (3d Cir.
1984), the Third Circuit had
reversed the district court's dismissal of a case in which an investor
of a trucking company sued a
competitor under Section 43(a) for
false advertising in the yellow
pages. The plaintiff claimed that the
false advertising contributed to the
trucking company's bankruptcy. The
Circuit Court distinguished the case
from Colligan, finding that in the
former, the noncompetitor plaintiff
sought standing as an investor, not
as a consumer. The court, interpreting the plain language of the
Lanham Act, rejected Colligan's
holding Section 43(a) only according standing to direct competitors.
In so doing, the court relied on
the reasoning in Smith, finding that a
party had standing under Section
43(a) if that party had a "reasonable
interest to be protected against false
advertising." In Thorn, the court
found that the investor had a
reasonable commercial interest in
the company.
Moreover, the court determined
that the investor had alleged a
"sufficient direct injury" as a result
of the false advertising, giving the
investor standing to bring a Section
43(a) claim. In so ruling, the Thorn
court granted standing to bring a
Section 43(a) claim to those
plaintiffs with a commercial interest
in the cause of action. The court
declared that "consumers fell
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outside the range of reasonable
interests contemplated as protected
by the false advertising prong" of
the Lanham Act. It concluded that
the "commercial interest" limitation would prevent consumers
from flooding the federal courts.
The Third Circuit found that the
plaintiffs in the consolodated cases
were consumers with no commercial interest. Thus, it concluded
that the plaintiffs were not
protected under the Lanham Act.

Consumers excluded
The court also rejected the
appellants' argument that the 1988
revision of the Lanham Act
expanded its scope to protect
consumer interests. In its review,
the court found no evidence to
suggest that Congress intended to
protect consumer interests through
the Lanham Act. While the
recognizing the need to protect
consumers from false advertising,
the court declared that the proper
remedy for such actions did not lie
in the Lanham Act; rather, state
courts, which allow consumers to
pursue statutory or common law
tort claims for misrepresentation,
offer more appropriate remedies.
In addition, the court noted that
Congress vested the Federal Trade
Commission with the authority to
act as a "watch-dog" of consumer
interests.
The Third Circuit concluded
that Congress created the Lanham
Act to regulate commerce and to
protect commercial interests from
false advertising and unfair
competition. Case law and
legislative history clearly indicate
that consumers as a class are not
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protected by the Lanham Act. The
court declared that only Congress
could properly expand the protected
class covered by Section 43(a).

Lighter liability
limited by court
Continuedfrom page 34
Dissenting from the majority
opinion, Judge Cudahy argued that
both the consumer contemplation
test and the risk-utility test could
be properly applied to the case at
hand. He noted that the purpose of
strict liability is to place the
economic risk on the party who is
best able to bear the cost-usually
the manufacturer. Although this
could result in absolute liability in
almost all cases involving children, this is a risk that the manufacturer must bear because certain
products will inevitably injure
children.
Furthermore, Judge Cudahy
suggested that while this is not the
course that all states have followed, Illinois has clearly chosen
to place the economic risk on the
manufacturer. Therefore, he found
that both the consumer contemplation and the risk-utility tests are
applicable. He concluded that
summary judgment should not
have been granted and that it was
a factual matter to determine
whether the lighter was unreasonably dangerous.
Writing in dissent, Judge Flaum
noted that as a federal court sitting
in diversity, the Seventh Circuit is
required to apply the strict liability
laws of the state of Illinois. He

noted that the court is not permitted
to decide cases based on what it
speculates to be the best rule or
course. Rather, it must make its
determinations consistent with the
applicable state law.
Judge Flaum declared that
Illinois law requires a federal court
to apply the risk-utility test in
products liability cases. He also
contended that the Seventh Circuit's
inquiry should have rested with that
rule of law. He further maintained
that since the Illinois Supreme Court
had announced no limitation on the
application of the test, it should be
applied in the current case to
determine whether the lighter is
unreasonably dangerous.
Judge Ripple, in his dissenting
opinion, declared that the Seventh
Circuit opinion has no significance
other than to decide the case before
it. It has precedential value only if
another district court in the Seventh
Circuit is faced with a case involving a disposable lighter.
Judge Ripple considered the
court's decision to hear the case en
banc a waste of time, implying that
it was improper in this case. He
noted that such a rehearing should
only be granted when consideration
by the full court is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity in its
decisions or when the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional
importance to the administration of
justice. Judge Ripple concluded that
since this case did not involve either
of these situations, but rather, only a
limited issue of state law, the order
granting the rehearing en banc
should be vacated.
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